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Rape Law Reform's Limits

A Senior Honors Thesis
by Beth Ann Richman

Anti-Rape Activism: Exploding Myths and
Interrogating Institutions

I
I

The Second Wave of "The" United States Women's Movement
began in the mid 1970's (Feree & Hess, 1985). Members of this
major fe minist move ment began to examine a range of issues that
surround the way gender functions in this country. Most of the
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issues addressed within this fe minist move ment were ones that
pertained to the health and happiness of white, middle-class,
heterosexual women (hooks, 1984, Snitow et. aI., 1983). Although
women of color, working-class whites, and lesbian and bisexual
women were all represented within the early stages of the
movement, the white, middle-class, heterosexual participants tended
focus on issues that pertained to their personal needs (hooks, 1984).
This was compounded by the fact that this redirection of focus was
not done in a self-conscious way (Mohanty. 1991) Because of this
dynamic other forms of feminism's have arisen, such as: Third World
Feminism, African-American Feminism, Lesbian-Feminism, Queer
feminist thought, Working-Class Feminism, as well as many others.
For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the white, middle-class,
heterosexual women's movement as" the Second Wave of Feminism"
since this is what the movement participants named themselves
(Feree & Hess, 1985). I do not mean to imply that this movement is
by any means the only, or the most important contemporary feminist
movement. When I use the word "women" I am using it in the
context in which the movement participants utilized it. Again, I am
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not implying that the themes that I am discussing necessarily apply
to all women.
One of the major issues that the members of the Second Wave
of the Women's Movement grappled with was the ways in which
violence functioned in women's lives (Galvin, 1985). Theorists began
exploring the syste mic nature of gendered violence. This
examination took place on many different levels, and in a variety of
arenas. Counselors, social theorists, legal theorists, journalists, media
critics, as well as women who had personal experiences with violence
all began to mobilize around the proble m of sexual violence
(Bumiller, 1987).

Rap~

and sexual assault soon became issues around

which a sub-movement developed. This has been termed the AntiRape Movement (Matthews, 1988, Bumiller, 1987).
The Anti-Rape Movement was a somewhat unusual movement,
in that individuals mobilized around a specific phenomenon that is
usually highly traumatic. Because of this, many of the Anti-Rape
Movement members produced literature on a the personal,
psychological dynamics of rape. Rape crisis centers and battered
women's shelters began forming to offer survivors of sexual violence
an alternative to an often insensitive and uninformed mental health
system (Frazier & Borgida, 1992). Other members focused on
exposing the interconnectedness of sexual assault and gendered
oppression (Dworkin,1989). A smaller, more liberal (as opposed to
more radical), subset focused on the way that rape was treated
under the law (Bumiller, 1987). Legal theorists, litigators, and
activist lobbyists began to analyze and scrutinize the laws in their
individual states (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992; Bumiller, 1987).
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Reforms to problematic rape laws were created and fought for by
these groups.

Rape Mythology and the Feminist Attack
One of the central foci of the anti-rape move ment was the
exposure of popular views of rape, rapists, and rape victims (Estrich,
1987). This was seen as a vital step toward bringing a more
comprehensive understanding of the issues surrounding rape to the
general public, as well as to victims (Bumiller, 1987). Leaders felt
that before information could be accepted, the old stereotypes had to
be interrogated. As I have stated above, these leaders were often
white, and often did not feel that focusing on the racial dynamics
that existed within rape mythology should be prioritized (Wriggins,
1983). Because of this bias, the myths that they attempted to expose
were often tailored to the experiences white, middle-class
heterosexual women. If there was an attempt to include issues that
were specific to the experience of women of color, many of these
early leaders would merely generalize their theories to "all Women"
(Mohanty, 1988).

There was little concern over whether the "rape

truths" that they were championing were based on racist myths that
these feminists had not challenged themselves. Some of the authors,
such as Susan Brownmiller, wrote explicitly about race; yet her
analysis proved to be filled with racist ideologies (Davis, 1983). This
has been pointed out as a major flaw of the anti-rape movement by
African-American Feminists (Wriggins, 1983; Bumiller, 1987).
Lesbian, gay, and queer theorists have often been criticism
these early feminist analyses as heterosexist (Snitow et. al, 1983).

3

These theorists felt that some of the proposed reforms rape laws did
not adequately account for same-sex assault on the stranger
acquaintance, or relationship levels. Other lesbian theorists have
vociferously disputed this contestation. This split has taken the form
of some theorists wishing to expose lesbian battery, and others
wanting to hide it from the mainstream (or refuse that it exists)
(Malone, 1994). Most of these theorists agree that sexual assaults
that are brought about by homophobia (i.e. a heterosexual is
offended or threatened by homosexuality, and therefore rapes) have
received too little attention.
Despite the lack of self -consciousness, and often racist, classist,
and/or heterosexist assumptions that were made within in the
move ment literature, it is important to examine the major analyses
of rape myths if we are to understand the building blocks of
legislative rape reforms. There were specific myths that were most
often attacked by movement theorists and activists (Estrich, 1987;
Brown miller, 1975; Frayling, 1986). Here I offer a composite of the
aspects that some of these theorists have elucidated. The rapist is a
strange man that is large, lecherous, predatory, and pathological. He
is thought of as strong and violent, he carries a weapon, and
threatens the helpless fe male victim if she does not comply. He is
psychologically disturbed, and has no intimates. The woman that
gets attacked is virtuous, chaste, and either a virgin or a wife. She
has never seen this man; and if he attempted to coerce her into an
interaction before the actual attack, she atte mpted to deflect his
advances. She is petite, attractive, innocent, and utterly helpless.
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She knows to tell her father or husband about the attack (which is
forced coitus), and immediately goes to the police or the hospital.
If the activist describing the myth placed value on racial issues,

slhe might have specified that this myth included a racialization of
the actors (Wriggins, 1983; Davis, 1984; Bumiller, 1987; Collins,
1990). In that case, the assailant is a black man and the victim is a
white woman. There might be additional factors such as, the black
assailant was on drugs, or that he rob s the victim as well. Other
feminists have excluded making this portion of the myth visible
because they felt that black men were a threat (and possibly a bigger
threat than white men); and that exploding that part of the myth
would harm the struggle against rape (Brownmiller). This type of
exclusion was a subtle form of racism that was characteristic of many
white movement members. It was based in racist mythologies about
rape that many members of the movement chose to ignore in their
analyses.
The myths that exist pertaining to child molestation do not
differ that greatly from those that surround adult rape. Again the
molester is a male adult who is psychologically disturbed. He is also
a rare breed of deviant. He is a stranger that will approach children
in parks, zoos or in school yards. He atte mpts to offer little girls
candy or other such rewards so that they will trust him. He then
forces them into a sexual act. As soon as the child is released she
runs home and tells her parents or a teacher. She does not return to
the molester, even if he has threatened her or her family if she does
not. Her family reports the incident to the police promptly.
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Anti-rape activists did not map out these myths in order to
deny that these forms of sexual assault, or any of the behaviors of
the parties involved, do not occur. Rather, their goal was to educate
the public that not all rapes or acts of molestation followed these
patterns (Estrich, 1987). The activists were responding to the way
courts. hospitals. mental health care workers. the media etc. tended
to disbelieve that other forms of rape were. in fact. criminal and
harmful behavior (Estrich. 1987; Brownmiller. 1975). They were also
attempting to pinpoint the justifications for the tendency to blame
the victim for the attack if slhe or the attacker did not parallel the
myth in any way (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975).

Criticizing the Legal Syste m
Dispelling these stereotypes was a major focus for the rape law
reform movement (Bumiller, 1987). The reformers hypothesized
that members of the legal system, jurors. and the actual laws often
accepted and perpetuated these myths (Estrich, 1987; Horney and
Spohn 1991; Matoesian. 1993). They theorized that in the courtroom
the victim was further victimized if slhe did not fit into these
perceptions (Estrich. 1987; Matoesian, 1993). They also noted that
the burden of proof was often on the ascriptive characteristics and
the pattern of behavior of the perpetrator involved (Estrich, 1987).
If slhe proved to deviate from what a rapist was su pposed to be.

again the blame would be shifted on to the victim (Estrich, 1987;
Brown miller. 1975). The reformers hypothesized that there were a
set of complex justifications that led many people to blame the
victim rather than the assailant (Estrich. 1987; Matoesian. 1993;
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Brownmiller 1975). What the rape law reform movement sought to
do by altering the laws was to shift the blame from the victim, to the
offender by focusing on his/her behaviors (Bumiller, 1987).
Some strains of the movement focused on strategies of shifting
popular opinion from judging on the basis of the victim's and the
assailant's ascriptive characteristics (W riggins, 1983; Estrich 1987).
These theorists sought to achieve attitudinal changes within the
general public. For the most part, due to the rigidity of the legal
system, as well as the constitutional premise of due process under
the law, legal reform was seen as an impractical forum for this type
of change. Such thought was more an influence to reform existing
laws, rather than a solid basis for the reforms themselves
(Matoesian, 1993).
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The Scope of This Essay
The literature that was produced by this movement attacked
the laws from a few different, but often overlapping, angles. The
first that I will explore is the criticism of the wording of the law.
Defining the crime of rape was seen as vital, in that, in many states it
was impossible to get a conviction for certain types of sexual
assaults, simply because statutorily they did not exist (Chappell.
1976). The second aspect of rape reform theory that I will review is
the arguments that attempt to prove that rape is similar to other
forms of criminal assault. This body of thought fits into an equality
based argument that has been championed by some feminist legal
theorists that deal with a great variety of subject matter (Bartlett &
Kennedy, 1991). These theorists have worked to reduce the
sentiment that rape is a special case because it involves sexual
activities or motives. This type of theory has been highly influenced
by the school of thought within the rape crisis movement that rape is
not sex, it is violence (Brownmiller, 1975).
Some rape law reformers have argued the opposite, however.
These reformer spoke out about how rape is special case, unlike all
other forms of assault. Feminist legal theorists have classified this
type of argument as the difference approach (Bartlett & Kennedy,
1991). Some of the more extreme difference reformers argue that
the rape of a woman by a man is what the law should focus on
(MacKinnon, 1984). They feel that this is a particularly pervasive
and insidious form of misogynist brutality, and that the law should
recognize it as such. Oddly enough, the schools of thought that argue
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that rape is like other assault, and those who argue that it is
different are not diametrically opposed. They often agree on the
fundamental points, but argue over what should be focused on, or
the most expedient way to solve the problem of rape. I devote the
third section to the theories that exist within the difference
approach.
There are some aspects of reform that defy fitting into the
above these categories. This is largely due to the fact that these
reforms often fit into both. The fourth and fifth sections are allotted
to rape shield law, and the influence of officials' and juror's biases.
Rape shield laws are laws that have been constructed to legally
prohibit the misuse of a rape victim's sexual history (Horney &
Spohn, 1991). Shield laws have been enacted in nearly every state,
and have taken many forms (Winter, 1989). I have devoted the
sixth section to an examination of the way race has functioned within
the history of sexual assault in the United States. This history serves
to challenge the way reformers have criticized the laws (Wriggins,
1983). I have devoted a separate section to these phenomena
because of the lack of acceptance of this form of thought within the
Second Wave of the Feminist Movement (hooks, 1984: Collins, 1990).
The battle to dispel rape myths within the legal system is what
comprises the final section. It has been shown that the biases that
courtroom members hold are some of the most influential factors in
determining conviction rates (Spohn & Horney, 1991). This has
become a major area of study. The way that these issues factor into
the actual rape law reforms is that they reflect on the ways that
reforms might not be achieving change on a deeper level (Matoesian,
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1993).

They challenge reformers to enact more sophisticated

reforms, as well as giving a perspective on what other move ment
activities need to be performed to effect legal change.
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Redefining The Crime
The legal definition of rape has been challenged by fe minist
theorists (Chappell 1976). This battle had been fought on both the
state and the federal levels (Winter, 1989). Although the federal
rape laws have been amended, the creation of criminal law is mainly
left to the individual states. To date, the Supreme Court has not
passed any land mark cases on criminal rape that would adhere to
the rape law reform movement's goals.
In their discussion of definitional change, reformers have noted

the historical shape of these laws, across states. The classic common
law definition of rape has been, "Unlawful carnal knowledge of a
woman by force and without her consent... .. (Chappell 1976: 131). A
more recent definition that has been said to be typically used and
enforced is,
..... rape is the act of sexual intercourse with a woman
other than the wife of the offender and without her
lawful consent. Emission is not necessary, and
penetration however slight is sufficient to complete the
crime." (Chappell, 1976:131).
Many states have devoted space in their definition of rape to
requiring that the woman prove that she had resisted during the
assault. I will discuss the resistance requirement in an upcoming
section.
The reformers' criticisms of these definitions were based on a
few factors, To begin, the use of the words "by force and without her
consent" has been seen as problematic. The way force has been

11

generally interpreted is that unless the man is physically holding the
woman down, is visibly larger and stronger than she is, or is beating
her through the entire act that force has not been used (Estrich,
1987). The exception that is often acceptable, if these factors are
absent, is that the attack was rape if the perpetrator is brandishing a
weapon (Estrich, 1987). When these factors are not present, often
the question within the courtroom shifts from whether the assailant
forced the sexual encounter, to whether the victim consented to it
(Estrich, 1987). Feminist writers have noted that widespread belief
in these hypothetical phenomena has served to invalidate most rapes
that are played out differently (Estrich, 1987, Brownmiller 1975).
Susan Estrich has distinguished between these rapes by terming the
rapes that people tend to believe as "'real rape", and any other form
of rape "'simple rape" (Estrich, 1987). Some writers have noted that
this is both due to the use of the word "'force", as well as the
perception of that word by me mbers of the legal decision making
process (justices, jurors, attorneys, etc.) (Horney & Spohn, 1991;
Spohn & Horney, 1991). The interpretation that they have seen as
biased and eXClusive, perpetuated (and has been perpetuated by) the
rape myths that I have discussed above. Feminists have documented
the widespread fear that might im mobilize a person who is being
sexually assaulted; and specifically how this is intensified for women
(Frazier & Borgida, 1992). They have also criticized the fact that this
definition does not account for cases in which the person who is
being assaulted has been rendered incapable of fighting due to the
fact that s/he might be unconscious or se miconscious from the
ingestion of alcohol or drugs, exhaustion, or physical illness (Chappell,
[
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1976). The reform that has been advocated to amend the
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definitional deficit has been the inclusion of the word ··coercion·· as
well as ·"force··. There have also been campaigns to have the law
explicitly state that it is illegal to engage in sexual intercourse with a
person if he/she is unconscious or otherwise unable to respond
(Chappell, 1976).
Another issue that reformers have criticized, and is exemplified
by these com mon legal definitions of rape, is that it has been
acceptable for a man to sexually assault his wife (Sigler & Haywood,
1987). Historically married women have been viewed as the
property of their husbands, and had no legal rights of their own
(Wriggins, 1983; Sigler & Haygood, 1987). Wives were said to be
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there for their husband·s sexual disposal, doing their ··wifely duty··.
Because legally they had no personal agency, specifically against
their husbands, wives could not prosecute their husbands for sexual
assault (Sigler & Haygood, 1987; Jeffords & Dull, 1982). This concern
has fed into a fe minist discourse surrounding domestic violence that
has expanded into discussions of different methods of sexual assault
within just marriage, as well as other forms of intimate personal
relationships (Dworkin, 1989). This is one area where the earlier
discussion of the use of the word force has been contested. Theorists
have explored the dynamics that function within (primarily
heterosexual) relationships that could lead to one partner being
sexually assaulted through use of emotional/sexual manipulation
(Russell, 1990; Dworkin, 1989). This manipulation often functions to

I. .

inhibit the ab used partner from labeling what happened as sexual
assault (Russell, 1990). It has often also led the abused partner to
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not to report sexual violence as sexual assault (Russell, 1990). This
has been said to occur because of fear of repercussions by the
assailant, shame that the assault(s) occurred, or fear of loss of
economic support from the abusing spouse (Russell, 1990). All of
these fears have been reinforced by a legal syste m that does not
consider rape within marriage unacceptable (Russell, 1990; Dworkin,
1989 ).
Robert T. Sigler and Donna Haygood sampled adults in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama (Sigler & Haygood, 1987). Their aim in this
exploratory search was to, "... measure public attitudes toward forced
marital intercourse, orientation toward traditional sex roles, and a set
of demographic variables." (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 76). They found
a high rate of endorsement of traditional roles within their sample
(j.e women should be in the home etc.). They also found that their
sample was willing to "endorse a felony penalty for most forms of
forced sexual intercourse" (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 78). The other
side of this, however, was that as the degree of intimacy between the
actors increased, the endorsement of a felony ruling decreased, with
one exception that is irrelevant to this discussion (Sigler & Haygood,
1987: 78). When the researchers looked at the percentages of
individuals who felt that forced marital intercourse should be a
felony (33.1 %), it was lower than those who felt that a misdemeanor
was more appropriate (45.2%) (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 78). When
they broke these statistics down to the group levelS, they found that
"Males, blacks, and those with high church attendance tend to favor
felony legislation while fe males, and whites tend to favor
misdemeanor legislation (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 79). They also
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found that 57% of those surveyed felt that forced marital intercourse
should be a criminal offense (regardless of the degree of punishment
that they felt was appropriate) (Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 83), The
researchers noted that those individuals that expressed belief in the
law's effectiveness felt that stronger penalties were appropriate for
marital rape, while those who were more cynical about the
effectiveness of the legal syste m endorsed lesser sanctions (Sigler &
Haygood, 1987: 83), They summarized by stating that,
"Attitudes about the traditional roles of women, the
effectiveness of the law, the perceptions of rape as an
assaultive act, and the right of wives to control sexual
access appear to be associated with endorsement of
legislation and the degree of sanction endorsement."
(Sigler & Haygood, 1987: 84)

Their study shows that there is not a great deal of support for
criminalizing forced marital intercourse, This finding might be
somewhat de mographically specific, considering that it was done in
the South, which is often assumed to be conservative (Sigler &
Haygood, 1987),
The study that Charles R. Jeffords and R. Thomas Dull
performed focused on the de mographic aspects that might factor into
one's attitudes toward marital rape immunity under the law
(Jeffords and DUll, 1982), Their sample of Texas residents was quite
large (1300 individuals), Only 35 % of the respondents favored
legislation that criminalized marital rape, They explained that "this
percentage varied significantly among the values of several
demographic variables," (Jeffords & Dull, 1982: 756) The variables

l
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that they found were significant were sex, age, education, and
marital status; they found that race, family income, and community
size were not significant. Jeffords and Dull found that gender was
highly influential when deciding whether marital rape should be
illegal across each demographic group. They found that 45% of the
women surveyed thought that marital rape should be classified as a
criminal offense, while only 25% of the men did (Jeffords & Dull
1982: 758). They also found that younger people were more likely
to be in favor of a legal sanction. Their statistics showed that single
people were more likely to be in favor of a prohibitory law (45%)
than nonsingle people (33%) (Jeffords and Dull 1982: 759). The
researchers went on to explain that those respondents with more
education (i.e. if they had a college degree, 41 %) tended to agree with
creating such a law more than those who did not grad uate from high
school (28%) (Jeffords & Dull 1982: 756). The factors that the
researchers noted, that might have made their sample less
generalizable to other states were the fact that it was done in a
conservative state (Texas); that the state maintains complete
immunity for husbands that rape; and that the term rape was used
as opposed to a less volatile word. The researchers also hypothesized
that, due to the age discrepancies, the newer generations might be
becoming more tolerant of marital rape legislation. They feel that
this might indicate that more conservative states will abolish spousal
immunity laws in the future (Jeffords and Dull, 1982).
These studies show that there is not a great deal of acceptance
for a marital rape statute. Sigler and Haygood found that 57% of

I

l
I

their sample supported this form of statute, while only 35% of
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Jeffords and Dull's su pported criminalizing forced marital intercourse
(Sigler & Haygood, 1987; Jeffords and Dull, 1982). Again, these
attitudes were done in somewhat conservative states. These states
did nbt already have this form of legislation on the books, which
might also be a reason why the attitudes were so permissive to
spousal immunity (Sigler & Haygood, 1987; Jeffords and Dull, 1982).
Diana E. Russell's book Rape in Marriage is an in-depth study
on the dynamics of marital rape. Although this is a fascinating study
that involves a large sample, her focus was not on the legal aspects of
rape. She aimed, rather, to elucidate the dynamics of marital rape,
and the experiences that the women had because of it. This is an
extremely important work, especially in terms of understanding the
frequency and brutality involved in martial rape (Russell, 1990).
Another highly contested aspect of the legal definitions of rape
is that they have often included the terms "carnal knowledge"2 or
"sexual intercourse" (Chappell, 1976). This has been contested
because these terms have been used to specify rape as a penis being
forced into a vagina. Feminist theorists and Lesbian-Feminists have
elucidated that other forms of sexual assault are extremely harmful
as well (Brownmiller, 1975; Snitowet. aI., 1983; Estrich, 1987,
Burgess, 1985). These have been not been recognized as criminal
sexual acts when this narrow definition has been used. Anal
penetration, oral penetration, cunnilingus (whether on the victim or
the offender), analingus (whether on the victim or the offender), or
penetration of any orifice with any object or body part that is not a
penis have been cited as acts that constitute sexual assault if brought
2 Carnal Knowledge is defined as sexual intercourse.
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about by force, coercion or intimidation. There has been an
argument that sodomy laws protect against these acts of sexual
assault. The counter argu ments have been that the acts the mselves
should not be criminalized, but rather their perpetration against the
will of another is what should define the crime (Snitow, et. aI., 1983).
This discussion of which acts, when performed against
another's will, should be constituted as sexual assault brings the
gender of the actors into question. Rape law reform theorists have
hypothesized over the importance of making the definition of rape
gender-neutral, or keeping it specific to when men rape women
(Bumiller, 1987).

There has been a great deal of discussion, in

general, over rendering laws gender-neutral within the fe minist legal
theory (Bartlett & Kennedy 1991; Bumiller, 1987).

Some feminists

have felt that gender-neutrality is a vital part of redefining rape in a
way that is inclusive of all possibilities. They feel that this would
open up options for prosecuting all sexual violations that occur
(Bumiller, 1987). Alternatively, it has been argued that there is a
historic pattern, which all women have inherited, that men rape
women (Bumiller, 1987). They feel that enacting definitional
changes that would render the laws gender neutral would be divisive
to convicting what they consider to be the more important rapes
(male/female) (Wriggins, 1983). There have been heated debates
countering this position, stating that it universalizes women's
histories, and is insensitive to the racist history that rape has
(Wriggins, 1983). It has also been strongly protested in terms of
same-sex assault issues (Snitow et. al.).
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Linda Brookover Bourque conducted a study on community
attitudes concerning rape in Los Angeles (Bourq ue, 1989 LOne
portion of the study was devoted to how the respondents defined
rape (both personally and legally), and the similarities that the
reported definitions had to California's legal definition. At that time
(1979) California defined rape as,
"... an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
person, not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of
the following circumstances ... (I)Where it is accomplished
against a person's will by means of force or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or
another..." (West California Codes, 1983; Bourq ue, 1989)

Out of her sample of ISS people, only 50 percent offered a legal
definition of rape, as opposed to all but 8 people (out of the entire
sample) offering a personal definition of rape (Bourque, 1989: 255).
She found that there was a tendency for the respondents who did
provide a legal definition to have a personal definition that was
closer to the 1979 California Statute; the trend was not significant,
however. She also found that people that gave both definitions
tended toward being in line with the statute. She found that older
whites proved more likely to give a legal definition. Bourque's
findings also indicated that those individuals who's definitions were
similar to the statute, and who included references to sexual activity
were more likely to offer a legal definition of rape. Of those who
offered the legal definitions, lower-income white fe males were most
likely to ".. .incorporate multiple components into their legal
definitions." (Bourque, 1989: 261) She also found that black females
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with higher incomes were most likely to provide legal definitions
resembling the California statute. Bourque reported that
respondents whom defined rape as an act that (only) involves force,
were more likely to offer legal definitions. Those respondents who
prioritized resistance in their personal definition of rape were the
least likely to offer a legal definition (Bourque, 1989). This suggests
that those who were more likely to devote their energies to thinking
about the law, were also more likely to offer a narrow and
stereotypical definition of rape.
The discussion surrounding the reform of definitions of rape is
highly charged. This is due to the fact that the definition serves to
symbolize the legal system's opinion of what rape is (Wriggins, 1983;
Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). Because it is the starting block for
recognition of what constitutes rape, reformers have invested a good
deal of resources in to effecting these changes (Goldberg-Ambrose,
1992), It is probably the most symbolic aspect of the rape law
reforms that have been enacted (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992).
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Arguing That Rape il Like Other Forms of Assault
There is a history of the legal system treating sexual assault
differently from other forms of assault (Chappell, 1976). Many rape
law reformers attacked this position, and argued that sexual assault
should be seen as having the same dynamics as other assaults
(Caringella-MacDonald, 1985; Sahjpaul & Renner, 1988). This
argument was born out of the school of thought that sought to
redefine rape as violence, rather than sex (Brownmiller, 1975). It
was seen as politically and emotionally strategic to focus on the
brutality aspect (though not necessarily overtly violent component)
of rape (Brownmiller, 1975). Politically this was done to combat the
widespread myth that women find rape sexually exciting, as well as
to express the pain and suffering that a rape victim experiences
(Estrich, 1987). Emotionally it functioned to communicate that the
subtle undertone of consentuality that the word "sex" conjures up in
no way applies to rape(Estrich, 1987). It was thought to allow
survivors of sexual assault a symbolic distance between violation and
consentua1 sexual activity that they engaged in either before or after
the assault. For these reasons, normalizing the view that all rape is
inherently violent, regardless of the degree of force used, has been
seen as a vital piece of rape law reform (Estrich, 1987, Brownmiller,
1975, Russell, 1990).
One aspect of traditional rape law that has been criticized is the
resistance requirement (Chappell. 1976; Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992).
Aside from the use of the word force in the definition of rape, many
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states included a statute that stated something to the effect of "the
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victim must have shown the utmost resistance at the time of the
assault." (ChappeJJ, 1976) This has been seen as problematic in that
it circumscribes the behavior of the person getting attacked; the
innocent party (Estrich, 1987). It has been argued that this sort of
restriction has not been placed on victims of other forms of assault
(Wriggins, 1983; Estrich, 1987). Some feminists have theorized that
this is a way that rape laws are discriminate against women
(Brown miller, 1975). They have argued that this sort of statute was
created in an attempt to expose women who are claiming rape as an
act of vindication, rather than because an assault actually occurred
(Estrich, 1987; BrownmiJJer, 1975). Some have gone on to claim that
the resistance requirement arose because of a perception that due to
the sexual nature of rape, and the frequent lack of communication
during sex, the assailant may not have been properly notified of the
non-consentual nature of the crime (Brown miller, 1975). Bienin
examines the mistake-of-fact defense within rape cases, and how it
has been used to subvert rape law reforms (Bienin, 1978). This is a
defense that has been used when the assailant allegedly does not
know that the interaction is not consentual. Many have arrived at
the conclusion that the resistance requirement and the rationales
that surround it assist in the dynamic of blaming the victim of rape
for the assault (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975).
Reformers have felt that by focusing on the victims response,
rather than the assailant's behavior, the victim is put in a position of
having to defend her Ihis actions (Estrich, 1987). Also, as I discussed
above, reformers have noted that fear serves to make individuals act
differently. If the victim of a rape, for example, becomes so terrified
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that slhe freezes, slhe would not meet the resistance require ment
(Burgess, 1985; Frazier & Bordiga, 1992).
Another contested aspect of traditional rape law that again
symbolizes the law's mistrust of the complainant in rape cases, has
been the corroboration requirement (Chappell, 1976). This was a
statute that required the victim of a rape to prove that the rape
occurred through corroborative evidence. It served to render the
victim's testimony as incomplete evidence, and therefore discouraged
many victims from prosecuting (Estrich, 1987; Chappell, 1976). Once
again, it has been pointed out that no other crimes involving assault
have required corroboratory evidence. For many of the reasons that
I have stated above, this has been seen as a way of overtly
distrusting the victim's account testimony (Estrich, 1987; Chappell,
1976). Again, it places a suspicious eye on the victim (in a way that
is absent in other criminal cases) (Estrich, 1987; Chappell, 1976). A
strong argument has been made that this statute is problematic due
to the fact that often rape (by strangers, acquaintances, or intimates)
takes place in a more private arena than other assaults (Lizotte,
1985). This makes it harder to produce corroborating evidence,
especially in terms of witness accounts (Lizotte, 1985). An argument
has also been made that rape is a difficult crime to produce
corroborating evidence for because there are often few visible
physical cues that show the way the victim has been brutalized
(Estrich, 1987; Lizotte, 1985). Often the physical harm that is done to
a victim is genital or internal, as opposed to other forms of assault
injuries that may be more visible, leaving cuts or bruises (Martin et.
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Some states have required that rape victims be subjected to a
polygraph. or lie detector test. This has been seen as another form of
invalidating the victim's testimony (in a technologically advanced
way) (Estrich. 1987). Many see the flaws of using a polygraph. in
terms of the reliability of the test. As one rape awareness educator
stated "most people start getting nervous. sweating. and their blood
pressure rises just thinking about the rape; let alone when
questioned about it for evidence." (Cygan. 1994) Again. the case is
made that rape is being singled out as unique. and victims are being
suspected of falsifying testimony (Estrich. 1987).
One solution to the corroboration requirement. by more
conservative reformers. is a state funded advanced method of
evidence collection (Martin et al., 1985). The Rape Kit Exam was
created to suite this evidentiary need. This exam can only be fully
performed if the victim reports to the hospital very quickly. has not
showered. and is wearing the clothes s/he was attacked in (Martin et
al.. 1985). It has been argued that the kit is cruel. and not effective
enough to merit it's use (Martin et al.. 1985). Others argue that
evidence collection should not be improved; belief in victims'
testimonies should (Martin et al., 1985). Nevertheless. the
institutionalization of the Rape Kit Exam has been seen as a
progressive step by some reformers (Martin et al.. 1985).
In their discussion of the use and distribution of the Rape Kit
Exam. Martin. DiNitto. Maxwell. & Norton discuss the personal
repercussions that some rape law reforms might have (Martin et. 'al..
1985). Martin et. al. discussion is focused on changing the
unnecessary trauma that a victim is subject to under the legal
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system. Their study examined the way Rape Kits are administered:
where, by whom, and what is actually being done. They studied the
hospitals and rape crisis centers in Florida, where the state
subsidized the kits. They found that a variety of individuals
administer the kit depending on where it's done, who has the time
and interest, and what the sex of the victim was. In terms of the
procedures involved, they briefly discussed the controversy around
standardizing the kit. The controversy consists of weighing
jurisdictional freedom against having evidence be translatable across
jurisdictions (Martin et. aI., 1985).
One of the overarching issues in this discussion of
standardization is what should actually be included when performing
the exam (Martin et. aI., 1985). This discussion has revealed a
tension in the interests of the heath-care system, the legal system,
and the mental health-care system. In other words, some
procedures that may yield better evidence may obstruct the
physician's ability to treat the patient as quickly as needed. This
procedure may also be deemed unnecessarily cruel and traumatic by
rape crisis counselors. Martin et al. concluded that rape should be
treated as any other crime, and that corroboration statutes are
unnecessary. Since this is not the case, they recom mend that certain
procedures that are cruel and rarely come into court as necessary
evidence, should be abolished (i.e. plucking numerous pubic hairs out
by the root to compare with the those of the assailant in order to
determine whether intercourse had occurred). They advocated
standardization of the most humane procedure possible. The feel
that the Rape Kit Exam should not be administered in hospital

25

emergency rooms, but rather in rape crisis centers. They also
recommend that the person who performs the exam be someone who
has received training, and who wants to be an examiner, regardless
of their official title. They advocated that governmental subsidies be
granted for the kit and the training of examiners. They also
hypothesized that the victim would greatly benefit from the
examiners having undergone sensitivity training (Martin et. aI.,
1985).
One study that has been done to evaluate the progress of laws
that have rendered rape more similar to other criminal offense was
done by Suresh Sahjpaul and K. Edward Renner in 1988. Their study
investigated the way that Canadian rape reforms have actually
played out in court. The new laws redefined rape as sexual assault,
eliminated the need for corroboration, eliminated the need to prove
penetration, and established rape shield laws (regarding sexual
history of the victim). The researchers were attempting to
understand the way the law functioned by observing sexual assault
and physical assault court cases, and comparing the victim's
experience. They measured this by analyzing the questions posed to
the victim. They also reviewed statistics regarding conviction rates.
Their conclusion was that both rape and other physical assault were
..... undercharged in terms of the severity of the offense." (Sahjpaul &
Renner, 1988).

They also felt that the gains made by the reformers

did little to actually change the experience of the victim, or raise the
chances of rape trials ending in convictions Sahjpaul and Renner also
expressed the view that Rape Trauma Syndrome experts (a
discussion of which will follow below) should not be used because

26

they reinforce stereotypes. They feel that through this defense,
psychologists contrib ute to the "further victimization" by classifying
the victim as a "mental health case" (Sahjpaul & Renner 1988: 511).
Their final word was "the new law has not altered the actual
practices" (Sahjpaul & Renner 1988: 512).
The argument that rape is similar to other forms of criminal
assault is a tricky one to make. It often involves comparing forms of
assault that may be extremely different in motive and context. The
argument that all assaults are equal is a rather solid legal argument
to make, however. By appealing to law makers' sense of equality
and justice, many reforms have been enacted. The Difference school
of thought comes into conflict with the concessions made by the
equality based arguments.
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Arguing That Rape Is Not Like Other Forms of
Assault
Reforms have also gone in the direction of focusing on the ways
that sexual assault is different from other forms of criminal attacks.
Most of these are focused on ways to alleviate the burden that the
victim has to carry throughout the trial process, as well as increased
punitive measures for the assailant (MacKinnon, 1984; Estrich, 1987).
Some more extreme reformers have argued that the gendered nature
of male-fe male rape should be retained within the legal language
(MacKinnon, 1984; Brownmiller, 1975). They feel that rape should
be treated as a special case; a crime against a sex-class (MacKinnon,
1984).
One theorist that sought to elucidate the differences between
physical and sexual assault is Alan Lizotte (Lizotte, 1985). He
enacted a large scale statistical analysis comparing the physical
assault of women, the physical assault of men, and the rape of
women. He used the 1978 National Crime Surveys Cities Attitude
Subsample. The NCS used a stratified sample of individuals who
were over the age of 12. Those women and men who had admitted
on the NCS survey that they were the victims of these crimes were
the ones that he focused on for his analysis. His finding was that
respondents reported were more likely to report rape (50%) to the
police than assaults on women (48 %), or on men (43 %). Lizotte felt
that a multivariate analysis was necessary in order to fully examine
the differences between these types of offenses. There were also a
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variety of other variables (ages of victims and assailants, likelihood
of being married, victim familiarity with assailants, right of assailant
to be present in the place of the attack, property stolen, amount of
victims, time of day, and involvement of a weapon). Lizotte
theorized that there were different causal mechanisms for the two
forms of assault. When he performed a multivariate analysis, it
became clear that the victims that reported the rape to the police
had very strong evidence to prove that the rape occurred. It was
found to be a good deal stronger than the evidence provided by the
physical assault victims who reported to the police. He found that
the assault victims had more idiosyncratic patterns in reporting (the
victim's age, the offender's age, the time of the assault, and whether
or not it was completed) (Lizotte, 1985: 181). Rape victims, on the
other hand, only reported when they had a strong case (i.e. there was
theft as well, the assailant was a stranger, the offender had a right to
be present, there was serious injury, or the victim was married and
the assailant was not her husband). Lizotte also found three other
factors that would probably be helpful in attaining a conviction,
which were: the offender being black and the victim being white;
more than one victim; and use of a weapon. While they would greatly
influence in a finding of guilt, these factors (that prompted victims of
physical assault to report), did not prompt rape victims to report the
crime. He explained this as possibly being a function of the victims
not knowing that these dynamics would increase their chances for
conviction. Lizotte also reported one other variable that is significant
for rape: highly educated women were less likely to bring the case to
the police. He hypothesized that this could occur because highly
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educated women might be more familiar with the criminal justice
system's treatment of rape victims (Lizotte, 1985: 184). He
concluded that the studies that have shown that rape is similar to
other forms of criminal assault in terms of getting a conviction could
be falling prey to an inadvertent censoring bias. He asserted that
this occurs because, as his findings show, only the rape victims with
the strongest cases get reported and are brought to trial, as opposed
to other assault cases (Lizotte, 1985).
One type of reform (that also corresponds to an increase in
technology) is the use of video transmission when the victim is
testifying. Reformers have advocated the use of video cameras so
that victims that are terrified (or terrorized) by their assailants do
not have to be exposed to them in court (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992;
Gothard, 1987). While this has been done to alleviate the anxiety of
the victim at hand, this reform has been primarily aimed at
increasing the reporting rate of rapes (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992), The
logic has been that the victim might be more likely to come forward
if s/he knows that s/he will not have to face the attacker in open
court. The focus of this battle has often been on allowing child
victims of sexual assault to testify via video transmission (Gothard,
1987). The reformers that have pioneered this fight have focused on
the way fear and intimidation operated for children who have had
their sexual boundaries invaded (Gothard, 1987). They have argued
that other types of assault (i.e. physical) are less terrifying and
stigmatized. This has led the m to advocate the use of video
testimony only for rape cases, based on the unique issues involved
(Frazier & Bordiga, 1992; Gothard, 1987).
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The question of the way that sexual assault affects individuals,
be they children or adults, is the focus of another type of reform as
well. Some reformers have pushed to allow expert witness
testimony to be admitted as evidence in rape cases (Frazier &
Bordiga, 1992). The experts that they speak of are psychiatrists,
psychologists, and counselors that have experience dealing with
survivors of sexual assault. The aspect of sexual assault that these
reformers felt needed clarification in the courtroom is what has been
termed Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992).
Rape Trauma Syndrome is a psychological term for the processes that
some victims of sexual assault go through because of the trauma
caused by the assault. Some of the symptoms are said to be chronic
fear, anxiety, depression, social maladjustment, sleeping disorders,
severe memory loss, etc.(Frazier & Borgida, 1992; Hazelwood &
Burgess, 1987) The justification for allowing these individuals to
give expert testimonies is that they, by observing the victim's
symptoms and/or mental state, will be able to asses whether the
victim has been sexually assaulted (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992) .
Reformers have seen this as necessary to dispel myths about how a
rape victim should act that are held by the jury and the courtroom
officials (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992, Estrich, 1987). Furthermore it can
been argued that this sort of expert testimony is vital because of the
specific components of RTS. In other words, if one is seized with
incapacitating anxiety whenever one thinks of the assault, testifying
in court would be a near impossibility.
In their article on Rape Trauma Syndrome, Patricia A, Frazier
and Eugene Borgida explore the issues surrounding allowing
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"experts" to testify that a victim of sexual assault is suffering from
RTS (Frazier & Borgida, 1992). They examine the legal arguments
against using RTS as evidence, such as the questions of helpfulness,
prejudicial impact, and scientific reliability. They also go into the
controversy about the qualifications of the expert witness. They
examine the ways that these issues play out in case law, as well as in
the available psychological research. Their article was not directed
toward drawing conclusions, but rather toward a general discussion
of the issues (Frazier & Bordiga, 1992).
Arguments that rape should be legally treated as a special case
are somewhat difficult to make under our legal syste m. Although
this is the historical pattern that rape laws have followed, a
progressive liberal stance would argue that to correct this historical
pattern, we must render rape laws equal to other forms of assault.
This is a case where the widespread mythology surrounding rape has
helped the struggle, however. It seems that these arguments are less
often heard because rape is still seen as a crime that is perpetrated
by psychological deviants. This is especially true for most people
when they compare a rape to, for example, an assault that has occurs
during a theft. Although the belief that rape is a highly deviant
crime had helped aid reforms that attempt to classify rape as a
uniq ue and brutal crime, there has been a backlash in that it is more
likely that those who fit the deviant image will be convicted. This
basis for judgment does not aid in convicting (or reporting) the well
respected members of society who are sexually violent, coercive, and
invasive.
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Rape Shield Laws, A Little of Each
Another type of reform defies being boxed into either of the
legal discourses of difference or equality. Arguments over the
inclusion of rape shield laws have utilized components of the all the
arguments that I have summarized above. Rape shield laws are
statutes that render the victim's past sexual behavior inadmissible as
evidence or as biasing statements during a trial (Chappell, 1976;
Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). These laws have varied in the degree of
extremity. For example, some theorists have advocated a total
withholding of any form of information about the victim's sexual
history, by arguing that it is never relevant to the case at hand
(Spohn & Horney, 1991; Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). This has
come from the radical school of thought that argues a (female)
victim,'s word should never be challenged; and therefore it is all the
evidence that the court needs (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975).
These theorists have taken the corroboration requirement and
basically reversed it. Furthermore they have pointed to the way in
which such evidence has been used to blame the victim for the
assault (Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). These reformers exposed
the way in which prosecutors have painted pictures of the victim
that portray them as unchaste, overly sexual, or nymphomaniacal
(Estrich, 1987; Brownmiller, 1975). Rape shield laws (regardless of
the extremity of the reform at hand), were created to reduce the
exploitation of the victim's past sexual history in court (Spohn &
Horney, 1991; Winter, 1989).
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The questions that the less extreme reformers have grappled
with include a discussion of what evidence is appropriate (Winter,
1989; Horney & Spohn, 1991). They have struggled over the
admissibility of evidence that might reveal something about the
victim's sexual activities, but might also reinforce her/his case
(Winter, 1989; Horney & Spohn, 1991). What is often brought up is
the question of the admissibility of physical evidence that the rape
occurred (i.e. the attacker's semen collected from the victim's body,
other proof that there had been sexual activity between the attacker
and the victim, venereal disease transmission, etc.) (Spohn & Horney,
1991; Winter, 1989). These issues have been seen as vital to
winning cases by the more pragmatic reformers, and therefore
necessary to allow. In order to insure that these pieces of evidence
(that are usually collected during a Rape Kit Examination) are not
used to bias the court's opinion of the victim' (through the exposure
of his/her sexuality), reformers have pushed to explicitly state the
exact components that are admissible (Horney & Spohn, 1991). They
have also felt that the reasons for the exceptions to the general rape
shield need to be made explicit. These types of shield laws have
specified that the victims history will only be admitted if the
prejudicial nature of the evidence does not outweigh the probative
value (Horney & Spohn, 1991). This decision has often been left up to
the court. Reformers have also argued that there should be in

camera hearings before the evidence is deemed admissible (Spohn &
Horney, 1991 ; Winter, 1989).
Kathleen Winter, a legal theorist, delves into the issues
surrounding the federal rape shield statute entitled the Federal Rule
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of Evidence 412 (Winter, 1989). This was the first amend ment to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and was passed November 28,1975.
Before this was passed prosecutors in a rape trials, as all other forms
of criminal trails, were allowed to utilize character evidence. She
points out the way that past sexual behavior was used to discredit
the alleged victim's character in that "unchastity" in women was
relevant, not only on the issue of consent, but also the as bearing on
the complainants credibility (W inter, 1989: 954). This had been
sanctioned by the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2). Character
evidence included the admission of the victim's past sexual history.
Rule 412 was passed as an exclusionary rule. It stated that the use
of past sexual behavior is no longer permissible as evidence in rape
trials. There are three exceptions to this Rule, however. What is
admissible is evidence that is "constitutionally required", past sexual
activity with the alleged assailant in order to flesh out the consentual
nature of the act; evidence of the alleged victim's sexual activity with
the alleged assailant or others in order to determine if the accused
was the source of se men or injury (W inter, 1989).
Winter feels that the battles that have taken place on the state
level over rape shield laws is a critical piece of history leading up to
Federal Rule of Evidence 412. She states this, and goes on to examine
the differing degrees of severity of rape shield laws that have been
enacted on the state level (noting that nearly every state had
included some type of rape shield reform). Winter's hypothesis is
that these laws have been interpreted in ways that are not consistent
to their meaning, nor the intentions of reformers. She writes on how
relevant pieces of evidence have been excluded from cases because
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of this misinterpretation. She feels that this is due, in part, to the
more restrictive statutes that take the power of judgment away from
the judiciary. She also notes that courts have taken measures into
their own hands, and "redraft[ed] the applicable statute, while others
held the statute unconstitutional as applied."(Winter, 1989: 979)
Winter discusses how the three exceptions to the federal rape shield
law give the courts the room that they need to make these
judgments; yet in the case United States v. Shaw, the Eighth Circuit
Court ignored the exceptions. She feels that the court, "... exclud[ed]
highly probative evidence critical to allowing the accused to defend
himself", and that this functioned to, "violate his right to due process
of the law."(Winter, 1989: 980) Winter explained this violation as
unconstitutional, thus violating one of the three safety valves in
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (W inter, 1989).
Cassia Spohn and Julia Horney, a Professor and an Associate
Professor of Criminal Justice, have a different approach in their
discussion of rape shield laws (Spohn & Horney, 1991). They, too,
question the degree to which the officials (judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys) execute rape laws. Their intent is not to argue
the constitutionality of the laws, but rather to see if the laws have
significantly changed the way in which officials think about rape; as
well as had an influence on trial proceedings. Their underlying goal
is to examine the amount of imple mentation that rape shield laws
have actually received (Spohn & Horney, 1991).
Spohn and Horney note that all but two states, as well as the
federal government, had adopted some form of rape shield law
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by 1985. Since the degree of severity varies form state to state,
Spohn and Horney decided on a sample of jurisdictions that
represented the spectrum of reform legislation. They decided to
investigate Michigan, Illinois, and Pennsylvania jurisdictions to
represent states with restrictive rape shield laws. The states that
were chosen to represent permissive shield laws were Georgia, Texas,
and the District of Colu mbia (which in fact has no state shield laws,
but rather has relied on case law precedents). They interviewed
officials by giving them six hypothetical scenarios, and asking them
to judge whether they would be used as evidence in court. Different
aspects of a woman's (soon to be rape victim's) sexual history made
up the content of the scenarios. Each of the stories were constructed
to challenge the differing aspects of shield laws (Spohn & Horney,
1991 ).
The researchers state that the focus of their study is, "( 1 )
whether officials' responses vary among the six jurisdictions, and (2)
whether different kinds of sexual history evidence evoke different
responses." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: 140). They hypothesize that if
rape shield laws are being implemented, then the officials' responses
will correspond to their state laws. This would lead to a result of
responses varying by jurisdiction. If the laws are not being
recognized or implemented, however, the researchers expected to
find that the judgment of what is admissible would pivot on what the
specific scenario is. They also expected to find agreement across
jurisdictions as to what is acceptable as evidence (Spohn & Horney,
1991).
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Spohn and Horney found that the most important factor in the
decision of whether the sexual history in question should be
admitted was the nature of the evidence (i.e. the content of the
scenario) at hand. There was also a significant relationship regarding
the official's jurisdiction and their judgment of admissibility. They
reported that the official role (i.e. which position the respondent
held) and the gender of the respondent did not significantly alter tl).e
judgments. The researchers also found "... a general correspondence
between strength of the law and the officials' judgments that the
evidence would or would not be ad mitted." (Spohn & Horney, 1991:
153) Yet they were not able to simply order the responses by state
shield statute (Spohn & Horney, 1991).
Spohn and Horney did find that a reliance on informal norms
was widely used. An example of this reliance on informal norms is,
many officials state that they would not use (as evidence) the fact
that the hypothetical victim has been in singles bar; but that they
would use the fact that she had been engaging in sexual activity with
several groups of men on the evening that she was attacked. Spohn
and Horney state that this "... reflects attitudes about the
appropriateness of the sexual behavior described." (Spohn & Horney,
1991: 1 54) They feel that another explanation is "criminal justice
officials perceive a com mon connection between the
'appropriateness' of the sexual relationship and the fairness of the
trialfor the defendant." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: ISS) In other
words, "... the more deviant the behavior, the more relevant it is to
showing a pattern of behavior." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: ISS) They
also note that these judgments are in line with an acceptance of new
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roles for women. Spohn and Horney also hypothesized that there are
minimal (if any) incentives to comply with rape shield statutes. In
fact, in light of the appeals system, there is a motive to "err in favor
of the defendant." (Spohn & Horney, 1991: 1S6) The researchers also
suggested that some officials simply feel that sexual history is
relevant, and therefore admit it. It was noted that in the states
where in camera hearings were supposed to be held, they almost
never were. This was attributed to the fact that the judge would
prob ably allow the evidence to be presented anyway, so the hearings
tend to be considered a waste of time (Spohn & Horney, 1991).
An exploration of what their findings mean to the rape reform
movement reveals that if the laws are to work at all, they need to be
presented in the strongest way possible. The finding led the
researchers to believe that the restrictive laws do not function to
eliminate all use of sexual history, but rather regulate the degree of
usage of the victim's past. They also noted that shield laws function
best for those victims that have been raped by a stranger, because
there will be less reason to begin delving into the victim's past (all
states with shield laws include an exception regarding past sexual
history with the alleged assailant). They concluded on an optimistic
note, stating that most officials do support reforms. Overall, Spohn
and Horney felt that there has been a significant shift in attitudes
because of the new rape reform legislation (Spohn & Horney, 1991).
Rape shield laws are a direct action against the misuse of
victim's sexual histories. They seek to amend the assumptions made
by officials and jurors by rendering aspects of a victim's history off
limits. The difficulty with this is that the laws may be bypassed by
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those in power who feel that this is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment (the right to due process of law); or those who simply
think that it is inconvenient or wrong. Shield laws are an excellent
but symbolic beginning to the fight that a victim of rape should not
be judged on her/his sexual past.
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Juror's. Attorneys. and Judge's biases in Sexual
Assault Cases
In their article "The Law's The Law, But Fair's Fair:" Rape Shield
Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, Spohn

and Horney hypothesize about an aspect that has been focused on by
many legal theorists: the human bias when processing the laws. In
this section I will summarize some of the findings of researchers that
have sought to measure the influence of attitudinal variables upon
the decision making process in the courtroom. The focus has often
been on juror biases, but some of the braver researchers, like
Matoesian and Horney and Spohn, have sought to examine the way
officials' biases may influence the way that reforms have been
carried out.
Gregory M. Matoesian took an approach that is based on an
assumption that the dynamics of the courtroom are oppressive to the
victim (Matoesian, 1993). His agenda was to analyze how this second
victimization occurs. Matoesian hypothesized that the speech
patterns in courtrooms reflect the ways in which domination
operates to put the victim on trial. bias the jury, and influence the
rate of convictions. He also asserted that the patterns operate to
reproduce the oppressive atmosphere that controls the trials'
outcomes. Matoesian advocated a bottom-up approach to rape
reform, that focuses on the speech dynamics within the courtroom.
His argument was that "reproducing rape" is an active process within
the courtroom. Because it has to be produced, it can be amended. He
felt that reformers should focus on undoing these specific dynamics,

41

rather than focusing on broader, more general legal issues
(Matoesian, 1993).
Peter j. Nelligan searched for the connections between the
gender of the jurors and conviction rates in rape cases (Nelligan,
1988). His premise was that sexual assault is different form other
crimes in that the juror's gender might predict the outcome, more so
than in other crimes. He attempted to analyze cases from Oahu
between 1955 and 1977 by going back and determining the
gendered make-up of the individual juries. He hypothesized that he
would be able to determine the gendered differences in opinion by
comparing the mean number of women on acquitting and convicting
juries. He found that the mean number of women on acquitting
juries slightly higher than in those where there was a conviction; yet
the difference is not statistically significant. He cautions that this
does not prove that a juror's gender has no bearing on the decision
that they would make, but rather that the turn out in these cases did
not depend on that factor (Nelligan, 1988).
Nora K. Villemur and Janet Shibley Hyde attempted to tie
together some of the factors that might influence individuals to
convict or acquit the defendant in a rape trial (Villemur & Hyde,
1983). Their study was influenced by past research done by N. L.
Kerr who found that in automobile theft cases the '"attractiveness'" of
the victim was a found to be a partial determinant of the finding of
guilt. Villemur and Hyde felt that this might be a significant
determinant in the outcome of rape cases as well. They tested mock
juror's responses to age and attractiveness of the rape victim, as well
as the gender of the defense attorney. The researchers were also
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searching for any finding of a gendered difference in the decisions of

I

the mock jurors (Villemur & Hyde,1983).
Villemur and Hyde found that the gender of the defense
attorney had a great deal of bearing on the decision of the mock
juror. If the defense attorney was a woman, there was a much
greater chance of the mock juror handing down a finding of not
guilty. 71 % of the respondents stated that they would acquit the
accused if the defender was a woman, while only 49% would acquit if
the attorney was male. There were no significant findings regarding
age and attractiveness on the victim, or the gender of the
respondent. The one exception was that older victims were rated as
more respectable, and therefore the defendant was seen as more at
fault for the assault (Ville m ur & Hyde, 1983).
In the discussion of their findings, Villemur and Hyde
hypothesized three possible reasons why the mock jurors reacted so
strongly to the female defenders. The first was that the respondents,
due to pervading sexism, were so amazed that a woman could be a
competent lawyer that they "overvalued" her performance. The
second hypothesis was that the juror's perceptions of a woman that
would choose to defend a rapist (i.e. allegedly doing this to the
disadvantage of her gender) brought about a feeling of respect; and
thus, her performance became more believable. Their third possible
explanation was that the litigator and the woman on trial are sub ject
to the mock juror's comparative gaze. The juror finds the female
prosecuting attorney more respectable, thus devaluing the victim
and her experience. The researchers ad mitted that these hypotheses
needed to be studied further. They go on to point out some of the
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flaws of their study: the lack of a group decision making process, the
difficulty in reproducing trial dynamics, and the lack of pre-trial
selection that serve both the prosecutor's and the defender's
interests. All of these serve to render the findings somewhat less
valid (Villemur & Hyde,1983).
Horney and Spohn, in their study entitled Rape Law Reform
and Instrumental Change in Six Urban jurisdictions, explored the

impact that rape law reforms have had in six jurisdictions that
represent the spectrum of reform extremities (Horney & Spohn,
1991). The researchers collected court records data from (adult)
rape cases between 1970 to 1984. They also collected data on the
number of rapes reported to the police at that time. The jurisdictions
that they studied (progressing from most extreme reforms to the
least) were: Detroit, Michigan; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois;
Philadelphia County (Philadelphia), Pennsylvania; Harris County
(Houston), Texas; Fulton County (Atlanta), Georgia; and Washington
D.C. (Horney and Spohn, 1991: 122)
Horney and Spohn's results showed that the reforms enacted in
these states had very little effect on the reporting of rape, or the
processing of rape cases (Horney and Spohn, 1991: 129). They found
only a slight impact in Detroit. The results showed that in Detroit,
because of the 1975 reforms, there was an increase in reporting; as
well as an increase in the ratio of indicted to reported case, Their
results also showed, however, that there was, "... no change in the
percentages of indictments resulting in conviction, in convictions on
the original charge, or in the percentage of convictions resulting in
incarceration." (Horney and Spohn, 1991: 129) They noted that the
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increase in reporting was not consistent with an increase in reporting
for other violent crimes, and therefore could be attrib uted to the
rape law reforms (Horney & Spohn, 1991).
The participants in the legal decision making process possess a
great deal of power over the way rape law reforms will be enacted.
This has been amongst the most difficult hurdles for reformers. Not
only does changing the opinion of people take a great deal of time,
effort, and capital; but I would hypothesize that it is relatively
difficult to influence those who control the legal processes. Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose comments on the fact that substantive change
may not occur until those who learned about the reforms in law
school sit on the judicial bench (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). Although
changing the courtroom participants' opinions of rape is an uphill
battle, it is becoming all too evident that this attempt at changing
courtroom actors' attitudes on rape is pivotal to rendering rape law
reforms effective (Horney & Spohn, 1991).
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The Racialized History of Sexual Violence
Throughout much of this essay I have referred to the generic
victim. I have done this to be consistent with the language of the
works that I have been handling. Most of these works did not focus
on the role that racial issues played within rape law reform.
African- American Fe minists, and African-American legal theorists
have produced works that are focus on the dynamics between racism
rape legislation (Wriggins, 1983; Hall, 1983; Bumiller, 1987). I have
chosen to present this analysis in it's own category because of the
overwhelming exclusion of this in depth exploration by the other
rape law reformers. I did not want to present this material as being
accepted as normative to the rape reform movement, when in fact it
has been so ignored. I will first present a brief historical analysis of
African-Americans' experience of rape. I will then go on to examine
the way that theorists have tied this into rape law reforms.
There is a racial history to sexual assault in this country (Davis
1981; Hall. 1983; Wriggins, 1983; hooks, 1984; Bumiller, 1987;
Collins, 1990). The racial nature of rape is best exemplified through
the law's treatment of African-American men and women (Hall,
1983). During slavery, it was completely legal to sexually assault
African-Americans (Hall, 1983; Wriggins, 19831. Slave holders
utilized sexual violence both to enforce social control. and as a means
of reproducing the slave population (Hall, 19831. The rape of
African-American women by white men was widely enacted because
the children that the slave woman had (that would also be owned by
whites) would have a lighter skin tone (Hall, 1983; Collins, 1990).
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This increased a slave's market value, thus rendering rape as a
profitable enterprise for white men (Collins, 1990). However, if
there was an interracial cou piing of an African- A merican man and a
white woman the man was likely to be brutalized or killed (Hall,
1983). Often the violence enacted against African - A merican men
had a sexual component as well (i.e. genital torture) (Hall, 1983).
The sexual abuse of African-Americans was used as a form of
social control during the Emancipation era (Hall, 1983; Giddings,
1984). Widespread lynching of African-American men was justified
by accusing the m of com mitting sexual offenses against white women
(Hall, 1983; Giddings, 1984). This was an informal exercise of racist
formal and informal laws. As these atrocities became recognized as
illegal. the formal legal system began to perform historically similar
atrocities (Hall, 1983; Wriggins, 1983). The numbers of lynchings
reduced; but the number of African-American men that were
executed by the courts for sexually assaulting white women stayed
extremely (and disproportionately) high (Wriggins, 1983).
The extreme differential between the conviction rates of
African-American men and white men has brought AfricanAmerican Feminists and legal scholars to question if rape law reform
is actually going to bring about justice (Wriggins, 1983, Bumiller,
1987). If the reforms that are enacted attempt to institute stronger
sentences for assailants, without exploring the racial dynamics of
rape, they could serve to further these racist trends. The reforms
need to attempt to integrate the racial issues, and correct for them.
Unfortunately, most of the reform literature has not integrated the
race issues, often arguing that it is divisive to the gender issues
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involved (Wriggins, 1983, Bumiller, 1987). This has been seen as
unacceptable by many African-American theorists (Wriggins, 1983,
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Bumiller, 1987).
African-American women have been discriminated against
legally in a complementary way (Wriggins, 1983; Collins, 1990).
African-American women, whether they are raped by a white man
or a man of color, have an extre mely hard time getting a conviction
(Wriggins, 1983). Historically, sexually assaulting an AfricanAmerican woman has been legal (Wriggins, 1983). This trend has
filtered through the current legal system (Wriggins, 1983). One way
that this discrimination has manifested itself is through racist/sexist
stereotypes that portray African - A merican women as overly sexual
(Wriggins, 1983, Collins, 1990). Because of this racism, AfricanAmerican women's have had an extremely difficult time proving that
they did not consent to the sexual assault (Wriggins, 1983). The
rationalization goes along the lines of: African-American women are
more sexual, therefore, the woman in question must have wanted to
have sex with the alleged assailant. These stereotypes coincide with
the myths that rape law reformers have attempted to dispel through
their various arguments (i.e. enacting rape shield laws, abolition of
corroboration and resistance requirements, amending definitions
etc.) (Wriggins, 1983). The difference is that African-American
analyses are race specific, and serve to point out the systemic nature
of racist sexism. They point out that no matter how restrictive a
shield law is, it will not amend the racial discrepancies that
occur (Wriggins, 1983; Bumiller 1987). In fact, most of the reforms
that might function if there was no racial discrepancies made are
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irrelevant to women of color as this discrimination persists
(Wriggins, 1983; Bumiller, 1987).
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Method
I conducted a descriptive, exploratory study by distributing a
survey through the mail. The survey contained questions to
determine the respondents' opinions on the existing rape laws in
Ohio. The aspects of the rape laws that the respondents were asked
to comment on were ones that have been debated by rape law
reformers. The sample that I distributed the survey to consisted of
two groups: workers within the field or rape crisis counseling, and
criminal attorneys or legal advocates.
The sample populations that I surveyed were not randomly
selected, therefore my findings are in no way generalizable. I found
appropriate individuals by networking through those I knew in the
fields. The participants range from unemployed volunteers to those
holding J.D. and PhD. degrees.
Ohio Rape Law
I feel that an overview of the Ohio sexual assault legislation is
necessary to better understand my findings. Ohio is a relatively
progressive state in terms of rape law reform. The definition of rape
is gender-neutral, and includes forced oral sex and forced anal sex.
It does not account for sexual assault where a penis is not the

penetrating object. The law prohibits the impairment of a victim's
judgment through the distribution of mind altering substances.
There is an explicit statement that resistance is not required of a
victim in order to prove that a rape occurred. There is also no
corroboration require ment.

50

Ohio has a relatively permissive rape shield law. It states that
the sexual history of the victim is ad missible as evidence if it is
necessary to prove the origin of semen, disease, and/or
impregnation. The victim's history is also ad missible if involves
sexual activity with the offender This is only so if the court finds
that, "".the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that
its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value." (Ohio Revised Code 2907.02,1993: 101) There is
also a specification that these shield laws are left to the court to
judge when and how they should be enacted. It is added that these
judgments should be made during in camera hearings.
Spousal im m unity is explicitly denied for cases of sexual
assault. The way that this reform was incorporated, however, is that
within the definition of rape there is a specification that the victim is
not the spouse of the offender. It is included in the latter section of
the law that proof of marriage is not a defense against rape.
Medical treatment for the victim is funded; and that the state is
required to pay for treatment of venereal disease for both the
offender and the victim as well. The Code also specifies that all state
hospitals are required to staff a physicians (on call twenty-four
hours a day) that specialize in the treatment of victims of sexual
assault. The state of Ohio has also rendered child victims' video
testimonies legal. On a final note, in the section of the Ohio Revised
Code,

#

29 entitled "Importuning", there is a section that prohibits

sexual solicitation from a person of the same gender, if it is known
that the individual being solicited is hostile to homosexuality. I

5I

included questions about this in my survey in order to observe the
way the respondents accepted this piece of legislation.

Hypothesis
My hypothesis was that I would find different responses to the
questions on the basis' of field (rape counseling or law)' gender,

I

marital status and education level. I expected women, individuals in
the counseling field, single or cohabiting individuals, and individuals
with a middle range-education level to be more positive about rape
reform legislation. I guessed that these variables would factor in this
manner because the individuals that I described would probably be
more likely to be members of the Second Wave Feminist Movement,
the Anti-rape Movement, and the rape law reform sub-movement.
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Results
I received 76 of the 200 surveys that I distributed. About 55%
of the sample was female, and 45% was male (SD=.51. Racially the
sample was comprised of: 7.9% African-American, 1.3 % Asian, 1.3
Mexican - American, 85.5 % Euro- A merican, and 1.3 % classified
themselves as "other" (SD=1.2). 30.7% of the population was single,
58.7% was married, 1.3 % classified the mselves as cohabiting, and
6.7% checked the category "other" (SD=.9). In this category a good
deal of the people that checked "other" wrote in that they were
divorced. The mean age was 36.7 (SD= 11.6). The mean income level
was $30,7015 (SD=27582.11. The average amount of education was
18 years. 40 respondents reported that they had received some
education in the field of law. The mean number of years of legal
education for this group was 13.6 (SD= 1 0.1). 55 people had sexual
assault related education; the mean value in years being 7.9 (SD=7.8).
~

Crosstab ulation tables that were run with gender as the
independent variable showed that all of the respondents (that
answered the individual questions) agreed or strongly agreed with
several independent variables. They all agreed that the portions of a
victim's past sexual history that is defined as the exception to the
shield laws was acceptable (N=69, SCC=-.4799)'. They also all agreed
that evidence of past sexual behavior with the offender should be
admissible as evidence (N=63, SCC=-.619).
The respondents all felt that the awkward structuring of the
spousal immunity law might effect the way the law is carried out

• SCC refers to the Spearman Correlation Coefficient. For the crosstabulation
tables, see appendix.
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(N~50, SCC~-.3037).

Nearly the entire sample agreed that the rape

laws should be gender-neutral (N ~ 72,

SCC~.183 9).

All the

respondents that expressed an opinion on the ad missibility of expert
testimony on rape trau ma syndrome (and related syndromes)
expressed that they felt that it was valid evidence

(N~65, SCC~.5218).

This was also true when the independent variable was occupation
(N~64,

.3784). Again, nearly the entire sample agreed that video

testimony should be allowed for both child and adult victims of
sexual assault

(N~71, SCC~.5359,

and

N~70, SCC~.4419

respectively).

Aside form the rape shield legislation, this sample appeared to
be extremely permissive of rape law reforms. I did not measure
their reaction to the reforms when applied to other forms of assault,
and therefore can not state that they are rape law reform advocates.
They could be advocates of all criminal assault law reform.
An interesting finding was that, the field (rape counseling or
law) that the respondents were in had very little bearing on the way
they answered questions. The only areas in which there was a
significant correlation between field and an attitudinal variable were
questions about lie detector tests. The first question I asked was
whether or not the respondent felt that a rapist should be forced to
take a lie detector test. Only 50 individuals responded, the
significance level (a Pearson's Chi-Squared) was ,03263, and the
correlation coefficient (SCC) was .3784. The table (see Appendix II.

FIELD by LIERAPE) showed that 37.5% of the counselors, and 46.3%
of the lawyers felt that the test should be administered to rapists
(agreed, and strongly agreed); while 37% of the counselors, and 57.4%
of the lawyers did not (disagreed and strongly disagreed).

The next
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table has field as the independent variable, and asks the question,
should the survivor have to undergo the lie detector test, as the
dependent variable (see Appendix II FIELD by LIESURV:
Square~.03060; SCC~.27l51.

N~50;

Chi-

13.3% of the counselors agreed that the

survivor should undergo the test, and 38.5% of the lawyers did so.
In terms of disagreeing or strongly disagreeing 88.6% of counselors
did, while 61.1 % of lawyers fell into one of these two categories.

This makes logical sense in that the counselors were probably
more likely to be sympathetic to the victim's experience; and a liedetector test could quite easily be seen as a method of doubting
his/her experience. From the other side, the attorneys would
probably prioritize gathering evidence for the case, and may have
seen this form of data gathering as necessary. Another factor that
might have influenced the respondents, which I saw commented on

in several of the open ended questions, is the amount of skepticism
that the test has met. This might account for less people being
willing to advocate it's use in either field.
Overall, my hypotheses were in not proven. The lie detector
test was the only cite,in which the relationship between attitudes
and occupational/volunteer positions were Significantly correlated at
all. Education, gender, and marital status were in no was shown to
be significantly related to the attitudinal variables.
This does not, necessarily prove that my hypothesis was wrong.
My sample was fairly small, and not random. Therefor I can not
generalize my findings to counselors and lawyers at large. There was
also a good degree of crossover between the two fields that might
have biased my findings.

55

f

CONCLUSION

I~

The rape law reform movement has effected many changes. It
[

has fundamentally challenged the way many individuals have
conceptualized the legal and social institutions within the United

r
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States. I have only been able to scratch the surface of what these
actions mean in a wider context. The intersection of feminism and
the law is one wrought with difficulties. Many feminist legal
theorists write pessimistically about how the law is ineffective until
formidable social change occurs (Bartlett & Kennedy. 1993). Many of
the achievements made by the rape law reform movement are.
therefore, said to be more symbolic than effective (GoldbergAmbrose, 1992).
I would argue that legal symbolic change needs to occur. Social
change is a slow process, that needs to operate on many levels
simultaneously. Clearly, the rape law reform movement's tendency
to not be self-conscious about the racialized history of rape needs to
cease. There needs to be further interrogation into same-sex issues,
and issues affecting working class individuals, as well. It is
important that there be a more comprehensive overview of the goals
of the movement that can account for difference. specifically
differential oppressions. Working through the syste m is an
extremely challenging task for marginal thinkers. It often requires a
good deal of compromise. The rape law reform movement has
compromised a great deal by transforming personalized feminist
texts into legislative language. It needs to move one step further,

56

and compromise some of the movement history to account for the
history of rape in the United States.
Thinkers such as Matoesian, Horney & Spohn, and Wriggins all
challenge the reform movement to probe more deeply into affecting
attitudinal change through legislation. I feel that this is the direction
that the movement needs to take in order to recognize its goals. This
could take place in law schools, legal professional organizations, in
legal journals, or in the courtroom. This is a massive challenge, but
one that might serve to truly affect and reduce the patterns of sexual
violence within this society.
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Age (in years).
AGE
Number of Cases: 75
Missing Cases: 1
Mean: 36.693
Mode: 40
Standard Deviation: 11.647
Gender of the respondent.
SEX
Number of Cases: 76
Missing Cases: a
Mean: 1.447
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .501
Race of the respondent.
RACE
Number of Cases: 76
Missing Cases: a
Mean: 4.697
Mode: 5
Standard Deviation: 1.200
Vocational position held by the respondent.
POSITION
Number of Cases: 75
Missing Cases: 1
Mean: 2.893
Mode: 4
Standard Deviation: 1.476
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Income (in dollars per year).
INCOME
Number of Cases: 57
Missing Cases: 19
Mean: 37014.912
Mode: 30000.000
Standard Deviation: 27582.124
Marital status.
MARRIED

Number of Cases: 75
Missing Cases: 1
Mean: 1.902
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .912
The respondent's parental status.
KIDS

Number of Cases: 76
Missing Cases: 0
Mean: 1.408
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .495
Amount (number) of children.
AMTKIDS
Number of Cases: 46
Missing Cases: 30
Mean: 2.087
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 1.029

Years of education.
EDUCAT
Number of Cases: 71
Missing Cases: 5
Mean: 17.993
Mode: 19
Standard Deviation: 2.412
Number of years of education in a law related field.
LAWED
Number of Cases: 40
Missing Cases: 36
Mean: 13.575
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 10.078

Years of education m a field related to sexual assault.
SEXASSED
Number of Cases: 55
Missing Cases: 21
Mean: 7.971
Mode: 3
Standard Deviation: 7.824
Area of focus that respondent is in (i.e. rape counselling, law, or both)
(THis is a composit variable created from LA WED and SEXASSED;
I=LAWED; 2=SEXASSED; 3=BOTH; 4=MlSSING VALUE)
FIELD
Number of Cases: 72
Missing Cases: 4
Mean: 2,083
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .746

Respondent's opIlllOn on whether all sexual activity between
consenting adults in private should be legal.
CONSENT
Number of Cases: 72
Missing Cases: 4
Mean: 2.028
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: 1.256
Respondent's opinion on whether there should be a distinction
between female-male rape and male-female rape.
DISFMMR
Number of Cases: 69
Missing Cases: 7
Mean: 1.942
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .235
Respondent's opinion on whether the penalties for childhood sexual
assault should be the same for both genders.
EQPENMF
Number of Cases: 72
Missing Cases: 4
Mean: 1.056
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .231
Respondent's opinion on whether the law for rape should be gender
neutral.
GENDNEUT
Number of Cases: 72
Missing Cases: 4
Mean: 1.819
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: 1.079

~
I

Respondent's opInIOn on whether do you feel that someone should
get punished for propositioning someone of the opposite sex into a
sexual encounter if they know the person is hostile to the offer.
HETIMP

I
I,

.

Number of Cases: 59
Missing Cases: 17
Mean: 2.644
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 1.310

Respondent's opInIOn on whether a male-female rape should carry a
heavier sentence than a same-sex rape or vice versa.
HEVSCEN
Number of Cases: 4
Missing Cases: 72
Mean: 1.250
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .500
Respondent's opinion on whether a male-male rape should carry a
heavier sentence than a female-female rape or vice versa.
HEVSCEN2
Number of Cases: 0
Missing Cases: 76
Mean: Mode: Standard Deviation: Respondent's opinion on whether a female-male rape should carry a
heavier sentence than a male-female rape or vice versa.
HEVSCEN3
Number of Cases: 4
Missing Cases: 72
Mean: 2
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .000

Respondent's OpInIOn on whether a female child molester should
receive a heavier sentence than a male, or VIce versa.
HEVSCEN4
I .

Number of Cases: 4
Missing Cases: 72
Mean: 2
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .000
Respondent's opinion on whether a husband raping his wife should
receive a heavier sentence than a rape with the same gender
combination without the marital component, or vice versa.
HEVSCEN5
Number of Cases: 63
Missing Cases: 13
Mean: 2.143
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .435
Respondent's opinion on whether a wife raping her husband should
receive a heavier sentence than a rape with the same gender
combination without the marital component, or vice versa.
HEVSCEN6
Number of Cases: 56
Missing Cases: 20
Mean: 2.036
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .426
The respondent's opinion on the punishment for "Importuning."
HIMISD
Number of Cases: 42
Missing Cases: 34
Mean: 1.952
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .697

Respondent's opllllOn on whether do you feel that someone should
get punished for propositioning someone of the same sex into a
sexual encounter if they know the person is hostile to the offer.
HOMOIMP
Number of Cases: 62
Missing Cases: 14
Mean: 2.661
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 1.390

Respondent's opinion of the severity of the punishment for child
molestation.
KIDSCENI
Number of Cases: 71
Missing Cases: 5
Mean: 2.042
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .917
Respondent's opinion on the way the marital law
LAWSTRUC

IS

structured

Number of Cases: 50
Missing Cases: 26
Mean: 1.240
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .431
Respondent's opinion on whether a rapist should have to tale a lie
detector test.
LIERAPE
Number of Cases: 52
Missing Cases: 24
Mean: 3.808
Mode: 5
Standard Deviation: 1.415

I
I
I
[

Respondent's OpInIOn on whether a rape survivor should have to tale
a lie detector test.
LIESURV
Number of Cases: 52
Missing Cases: 24
Mean: 4.077
Mode: 5
Standard Deviation: 1.169
Respondent's opinion on whether it should be left up to the court to
decide whether or not to include a victim's past sexual history.
PASSEXCOl
Number of Cases: 63
Missing Cases: 13
Mean: 1.302
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: 4.973
Respondent's opinion on whether it should be left up to the court to
decide weigh the prejudicial nature of a victim's past sexual history
against its probative value.
PASSEXC02
Number of Cases: 53
Missing Cases: 23
Mean: 2.340
Mode: I
Standard Deviation: 4.937
Respondent's opinion whether past sexual actIVItIes should be
admitted under the existing legal standards.
PASTSEXI
Number of Cases: 69
Missing Cases: 7
Mean: 1.754
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .434

I

I
I

Respondent's OpInIOn whether past sexual activity with the offender
should be used as evidence.
PASTSEX2
Respondents decision to rank the following In terms of what deserves
the strongest to the weakest sentence:
Female-female rape.
RANKFF

Number of Cases: 8
Missing Cases: 68
Mean: 3.125
Mode: 3
Standard Deviation: 1.035
Female-male rape.
RANKFM
Number of Cases: 8
Missing Cases: 68
Mean: 3.125
Mode: 4
Standard Deviation: 1.126
Male-female rape.
RANKMF
Number of Cases: 8
Missing Cases: 68
Mean: 1
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .000
Male-male rape
RANKMM
Number of Cases: 8
Missing Cases: 68
Mean: 3.125
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 1.026

r

[

r
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The Respondents OpInIOn on classifying rape as an aggravated felony.
RFELONY
Number of Cases: 67
Missing Cases: 9
Mean: 2.537
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 1.700
The respondent's opinion on the admissibility of expert witness
testimony as evidence.
RP1RSYND
Number of Cases: 65
Missing Cases: II
Mean: 2.062
Mode: I
Standard Deviation: 1.345
The respondent's opinion on whether male-female rape should carry
a heavier sentence that same-sex rape, or vice-versa
SAMESEN
Number of Cases: 9
Missing Cases: 67
Mean: 1.333
Mode: I
Standard Deviation: .500
The respondent's opinion as to if the existing definition of rape
broad.
SEXCONBR
Number of Cases: 56
Missing Cases: 20
Mean: 3.929
Mode: 4
Standard Deviation: 1.263

lS

to

The respondent's opmlon as to if the existing definition of rape
narrow.
SEXCONNA

IS

to

Number of Cases: 45
Missing Cases: 31
Mean: 3.422
Mode: 4
Standard Deviation: 1.118
The respondent's opinion on whether there should be a distincton
between same-sex and male-female rape.
SSVSMFR
Number of Cases: 74
Missing Cases: 2
Mean: 1.973
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: .163
The respondent's opinion on whether video testimony m adult rape
cases should be admissible or not.
VIDEOAD
Number of Cases: 70
Missing Cases: 6
Mean: 2.700
Mode: 2
Standard Deviation: 1.536
The respondent's opinion on whether video testimony m childhood
sexual assault cases should be admissible or not.
VIDEOKID
Number of Cases: 71
Missing Cases: 5
Mean: 1.930
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: 1.234

Respondent's opinion on whether a husband can rape his wife.
HRAPEW
Number of Cases: 74
Missing Cases: 2
Mean: 1.041.
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .199
Respondent's opinion on whether a wife can rape her husband.
WRAPEH
Number of Cases: 63
Missing Cases: 12
Mean: 1.063
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .244
Respondent's opinion on whether a woman can rape a man.
WRAPEW
Number of Cases: 74
Missing Cases: 2
Mean: 1.581
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .759
Respondent's opinion on whether a woman can rape a woman.
WRAPEW
Number of Cases: 76
Missing Cases: 0
Mean: 1.083
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: 3.476

L

Respondent's opinion on whether a man can rape a woman.
MRAPEW
Number of Cases: 75
Missing Cases: 1
Mean: 1.293
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .540
Respondent's opinion on whether a man can rape a man
MRAPEW
Number of Cases: 76
Missing Cases: 0
Mean: 1.237
Mode: 1
Standard Deviation: .428
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Spearman's

Correlation

FIELD BY LIERAPE
Pearsons Coefficient=.3784
FIELD BY LIESURV
Pearsons Coefficient=.2715
PosmON BY RPTRSYND
Pearsons Coefficient=.3784
SEX BY GENDNEUT
Pearsons Coefficient=.1839
SEX BY LAWSTRUC
Pearsons Coefficient=-.3037
SEX BYPASTSEXI
Pearsons Coefficient=-.4799
SEX BY PASTSEX2
Pearsons Coefficient=-.6197
SEX BY VIDEO AD
Pearsons Coefficient=.4419
SEX BY V1DEOKID
Pearsons Coefficient=.5359

Coefficients

FIELD

by

LIERAPE
LIERAPE
Count
Row Pet
Col Pet
Tot Pct

1. 00

FIELD
1. 00

I
I

Page 1 of 1

I

1
8.3
33.3
2.0

2.00

Row
5.00\ Total

4

2

33.3

16.7
15.4
4.0

5
41. 7
20. B
10.0
1B.B
12.5
6.0

40.0
8.0

12
24.0

16
32.0

~

4

12.5
66.7
4.0

25.0
40.0
8.0

7
43.8
53.8
14.0

2
9.1
20.0
4.0

18.2
30.8
8.0

16
72.7
66.7
32.0

22
44.0

10
20.0

13
26.0

24
48.0

50
100.0

"

3.00

column
Total

4.00

2.00\

3
6.0

Chi-Square

--------------------

4

value

3

DF

-----------

Pearson
Likelihood Ratio
Mantel-Raenszel test for

13.74399

6

15.19766
6.10808

6

1

linear association
Minimum Expected Frequency .720
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 -

Number of Missing observations:

26

8 OF

Significance

------------

12 ( 66.7%)

.03263
.01877
.01346

FIELD

by

LIESURV
LIESURV
count
Row Pct
Col Pet
Tot Pet

Page 1 of 1

I
2.00

4.00

5.00

Row
Total

l!IELD
1. 00

5
38.5
62.5
10.0

2
15.4

I

11. B

4.0
53.3
47.1
16.0

5
33.3
20.0
10.0

15
30.0

3.00

1
4.5
12.5
2.0

7
31. B
41.2
14.0

14
63.6
56.0
28.0

22
44.0

Column

8
16.0

17
34.0

25
50.0

Total
Chi-Square

Pearson
Likelihood Ratio
Mantel-Raenszel test for
linear association

B

value

Number of Missing Observations:

I

I

I

26

50
100.0
Dl!

10.66476
10.36459
5.48119

Minimum Expected l!requency 2.080
Cells with Expected l!requencJ < 5 -

i

13
26.0

2
13.3
25.0
4.0

2.00

[

6
46.2
24.0
12.0

4
4

1

4 Ol!

9 ( 44.4%)

Significance
.03060
.03471
.01922
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POSITION

by

RPTRSYND
page 1 of 1

RPTRSYND
count
Row Pet
Col Pet
Tot Pet

1. 00

Row
Total

POSITION
1. 00

13
20.3

13

100.0
20.3

20.3
2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

9
100.0
14.1
14.1

9
14.1

13

13

100.0
20.3
20.3

20.3

25

25

100.0
39.1
I 39.1
I

39.1

3

3

100.0
4.7
4.7
9.00

4.7.

1

1
100.0

1.6

1.6
1.6

Column
Total

64

100.0

64
100.0

>Warning # 10307
>Statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns
>is one.
Number of Missing Observations!

r-

L
I

I
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SEX

by

GENDNEUT

page 1 of 1

GENDNEUT

count
Row Pet
Col Pet
Tot Pet

I
1. 00

Row
Total

SEX

1. 00

2.00

40

40

100.0
55.6
55.6

55.6

32
100.0
44.4

32
44.4

44.4
Column
Total

72

72

100.0

100.0

>warning # 10307
>Statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns
>is one.
Number of Missing Observations:

4

I~

SEX

by

LA!lISTRUC

r
LAWSTRUC
Count
Row Pet
Col Pet
Tot Pet

I

I

Page 1 of 1
Row

1. 00

Total

SEX

I

1. 00

26
100.0
52.0

26
52.0

52.0

I

2.00

L

24

24

100.0
48.0

46.0

48.0

column
Total

50
100.0

50

100.0

>WaICning II 10307
>Statistics cannot be computed when the numbeIC of non-empty ICOWS or columns
>is one.

~

Number of Missing Observations:
..

f

I
L
I

26

r
r

SEX

by

PASTSEXl
PASTSEXl
count
Row Pct
col Pet
Tot Pet

I
I

1. 00

Page 1 of 1
Row
Total

SEX
1. 00

2.00

Column
Total

37
100.0
53.6
53.6

37
53.6

32

32

100.0
46.4
46.4

46.4

69
100.0

69
100.0

>Warning # 10307
>Statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns

>is one.
Number of Missing Observations:

7

I
!

SEX

by

PASTSEX2
PASTSEX2
count
ROw Pet
col Pet
Tot Pet

1. 00

page 1 of 1
Row
Total

SEX
1. 00

32
100.0
50.S
50.8

32
50.S

2.00

31
100.0
49.2
49.2

31
49.2

column
Total

63
100.0

63
100.0

>Warning # 10307
>statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns
>is one.
Number of Missing Observations:

13

I

SEX

I

VIDEOAD
VIDEOAD
Count
Row Pet
Col Pet
Tot Pet

r

I

by

Row
Total

SEX
LOO

2.00

~

l

L 00

page 1 of 1

column
Total

38

38

100.0
54.3
54.3

54.3

32

32

100.0
45.7
45.7

45.7

70
100.0

70
100.0

>Warning # 10307
>Statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns
>is one.
Number of Missing Observations:

6

SEX

by

VIDEOKID
VI DEOKI 0

Page 1 of 1

count
ROW Pet
Col Pet
Tot Pet

1. 00

Row
Total

SEX
1. 00

40
100.0

40
56.3

56.3
56.3

2.00

Column
Total

31
100.0
43.7
43.7

31
43.7

71

71
100.0

100.0

>Warning # 10307
>statistics cannot be computed when the number of non-empty rows or columns
>is one.
Number of Missing Observations:

5

AJlIlIPH~llIl«llix

'If'lfue

1Il!ll:

Sllllney

[ ..•

[

FIELD

by

SEX

page 1 of 1

SEX

count

I

Row Pct
Col Pct
Tot Pct

1. 00

FIELD

1. 00

I

3
17.6
7.9
4.2

2.00

29
76.3
40.3

I

I
Column
Total

6

26.1
15. a
8.3

17
23.6

14

82.4
41. 2
19.4

90.6

3.00

Row
2.001 Total

I

38
52.8

Chi-Square

3
9.4
8.8
4.2

32
44.4

17
73.9
50.0
23.6

23
31. 9

34
47.2

72
100.0

Value

Pear30n
Likelihood Ratio
Mantel-Raenszel test for
linear association

33.38433
37.43225
.00278

Minimum Expected Frequency -

B.028

Number of Missing Observations!

OF
2
2
1

Significance

.00000
.00000
.95793

Please read each question carefully and either circle your choice, or
write out your answer. The survey is on both sides of the page.
1) What is you age (in years)
2) What is your sex?
[1] female
[2] male

3) How many years of education have you completed?
4) Please list the degrees that you have earned.

5) If you are in a law related field, how many years have you been in that
c_

,I

~

field?_
6) If you are in a field that deals with sexual assault issues, how long have you

been in that field?_
7) Are you currently
[1] non-administrative paid staff
[2] in an administrative position
[3] volunteer
[4] other (please specify) ______________ _

[5] no answer
8) Please state your average yearly income.

9) What is your race or ethnicity?
[ 1]
[2]

[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]

[7]

Black/African-American
Asian/Asian-American
Native AmericanlEskimo/Aleut
Mexican-American/Puerto Rican/Cuban
White/European-American
Other (please specify)
No answer/don't know

10) What is your religious affiliation?

American

(please be specific)

11) What is your marital status?
[1] single

[2] married
[3]

cohabiting

[4] Other (please specify)
[5] no answer
12) Do you have any children?
[1] yes
[2] no
[3] no answer

1
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If you answered "yes" to question #12, please answer questions #13 and #14.

If

you answered "no" or "no answer", please skip to question #15.
13) How many children do you have? __

I

14) Please list the sex of you children, and their ages
15) The law states,

I
I

1-

"The principle on which the first group of offenses (i.e. SEXUAL
ASSAULTS)is founded is that sexual activity of whatever kind
between consenting adnlts in private ought not be a crime."l
Do you
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly disagree

16) If you disagree or strongly disagree, what sort of sexual actIvity between
consenting adults in private do you think should be illegal? Please be specific.
17) The Ohio definition of rape is based on ways that "Sexual conduct" is
misused. Section 2907.01 (A) of the Revised Code states "'Sexual conduct' means
vaginal intercourse between a male and female, and anal intercourse, fellatio,
and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex.
Penetration, however
slight is sufficient to complete vaginal and anal intercourse".
Do you find this definition of rape too broad in it's scope?
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly disagree

18) If you
exclude?

strongly agree or agree with this definition, what would you

19) Do you find this definition too narrow in it's scope?
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly disagree

20) If you strongly agree or agree that the definition is too narrow, what
would you include that is not stated?

2
1 All quotations in this survey are taken directly from Page's Ohio Revised
Code. Annotated. Title 29,{Anderson Publishing Co: Cincinnati, 1993).

I'

(For questions 21-41 I am referring to scenarios in which both parties are
adults)
21) In the case of rape, battery, or sexual harassment, is it appropriate to
disregard the gender of the individuals in question?

[
i

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly disagree

22) I believe that a man can rape a woman.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly agree

23) If you disagree or strongly disagree with the statement

III

#22 why?

24) I believe that a woman can rape a man.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly disagree

25) If you strongly disagree or disagree with the statement in #24, why?
26) I believe a man can rape another man.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

strongly agree
agree
neutral
disagree
strongly disagree

27) If you strongly disagree or disagree with the statement in #26, why?
28) I believe a woman can rape another woman.
[1] strongly
[2] agree

agree

[3] neutral
[4] disagree
[5]

strongly disagree

29) If you strongly disagree or disagree with #28, why?

I

I~

I
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30) Under 2907.02 of the Revised Code the rape of one adult by another adult is
a classified as "an aggravated felony of the first degree."
How do you feel about this punishment?
[I] too severe
[2] appropriate
[3] not severe enough
[4] no answer
31) Why do you think this?

32) If you answered "not severe enough" to question #30, what sort of
sentencing do you feel would be more appropriate?

I

L__
,

33) Do you feel that there should be a legal distinction between same-sex rape
and male-female rape?
[1] yes
[2] no
[3] neutral

If you answered yes to question #33 please answer questions #34. and #35.
you answered no please skip to question #37.

l

34) Which scenario do you feel should carry a heavier sentence?
[1] male-female rape
[2] same-sex rape

35) Do you think that male-male rape and female-female rape
should receive the same sentence?
[1] yes
[2] no

[3]

neutral

If you answered yes to question #35, please answer question #36. If you
answered no, please skip to #37.
36) Which do you think should carry a heavier sentence?
[1]
[2]

male-male rape
female-female rape

37) Do you feel that there should be a distinction between female-male rape
(the female has raped the male) and male-female rape?
[1] yes

[2] no

[3] neutral

I

If you answered yes to question #37,please answer question #38.
answered no please skip to question #39.
38) Which do you feel should receive a heavier sentence?

I
I

[I] female-male
[2] male-female

4

If you

If

39) Please rank these sex crimes in order according to what you feel deserves
the strongest to weakest sentence. Please do this by putting a one next to the
crime you feel is deserving of the most severe sentence, and a four next to the
crime you find deserving of the least severe sentence. Please skip this
question if you don't see a hierarchy, or you don't consider any of the choices
rape.
_[a] male-female rape
_[b] female-male rape
_[c] male-male rape
_[ d] female-female rape

If you answered question #39, please answer question #40.
answer question #39 please skip to question #41.

If you did not

40) Why did you rank the sentences for these crimes in #40 this way?
41) Under 2907.02 of the Revised Code the "... forcible rape of a victim under the
age of 13 carries the penalty of life imprisonment."
How do you feel about this punishment?
[1] too severe
[2] appropriate
[3] not severe enough
[4] no answer
42) Why do you feel this way?
43) If you answered "not severe enough" to question #42, what sort of
sentence(s) do you feel would be more appropriate?
44) Do you feel that the penalties should be the same for male and female

assailants?
[1] yes
[2] no
[3] neutral

If you answered yes to question #44, please answer questions #45 and #46.
you did not please skip to question #47.

If

45)Which child abuser should be more heavily punished?
[1] female
[2] male
46)Why do you feel this way?
47) Do you think that a husband can rape his wife?
[1] yes
[2] no
[3] neutral

I

L

48) If you answered no to #47, please explain.

5
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49) If yes (to question #47), how do you think that a husband who rapes his
wife should be sentenced in comparison to a man who rapes a woman who he
is not married to?
[I] more severe sentence
[2] equal sentence
[3] less severe sentence
[4] neutral
50) Do you think a wife can rape her husband?
[1] yes
[2] no
[3] neutral

51) If you answered no to #50, please explain.
52) If yes (to question #50), how do you think that a wife who rapes her
husband should be sentenced in comparison to a woman who rapes a man who
she is not married to?

r

t

I
I
I

[1] more severe sentence
[2] equal sentence
[3] less severe sentence
[4] neutral

53) Section 2907.02, (A),(l) of the Revised Code states,
"N 0 person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is
not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the
offender but is living separate and apart from the offender,
when either of the following apply:".
What follows is a succession of conditions that render the sexual conduct rape.
Under the heading (G) is written,
"it is not a defense to a charge under division (A)(2) of this
section that the offender and the victim were married or were
cohabiting at the time of the commission of the offense."
Section (A)(2) states
*****"No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the
offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or
threat of force."
What do you think of the way this is structured?
54) Do you think that this structure might affect the way the law is carried out
in terms of a case of alleged marital rape?
[1] yes
[2] no

[3]

neutral

6

55) The law states in section 2907.02, (D) of the Revised Code,
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity, opInIOn
evidence of the victim's sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the
victim's sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it
involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the
victim's past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that
the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and
that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value.
Do you feel that the victim's past sexual activity should be admissible as
evidence in circumstances other than the exceptions that are stated?

f

[1] yes
[2] no

[3]

neutral

56) Why do you feel this way?

L
I

57) Do you think that evidence of the victim's past sexual activity with the
offender should be admissible?
[1] yes
[2] no

[3]

[
58)

I

neutral

Why do you feel this way?

59) In reference to the question above, do you think that the court should
decide whether the, "evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case"?
[1] yes
[2] no
[3] neutral

60) Why do you feel this way?
61) Do you think that the court is capable of deciding whether the
"inflammatory or prejudicial nature" of the victim's past sexual activity with
the offender, "does not out weigh its probative value."?
[1] yes
[2] no

[3]

neutral

62) Why do you feel this way?
63) In section 2907.02, (C) the Revised Code states:
"A Victim need not prove physical resistance to the offender in
prosecutions under this section."
What do you think of this?
7
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I

64) Do you feel that individuals who can explain phenomena such as Rape
Trauma Syndrome, Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome or Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder should be admissible as expert witnesses in trials involving rape or
childhood sexual assault?
[1] strongly agree

r

[2] agree
[3] neutral

I

[4] disagree
[5] strongly disagree

I

65)Do you feel that adults that are alleged survivors/victims of sexual assault
should be able to state their testimony in court via a video transmission from
another room?

~

[I] strongly agree
[2] agree
[3] neutral

L

[4] disagree
[5] strongly disagree
66)If you disagree or strongly disagree, why?

I
I

67)Do you feel that children that are alleged survivors/victims of sexual
assault should be able to state their testimony in court via a video transmission
from another room?
[1] strongly agree
[2] agree
[3] neutral
[4] disagree
[5] strongly disagree
68)If you strongly disagree or disagree, why?
69) Do you feel that the result of a Polygraph or Lie Detector Test, performed
on the alleged rapist or child molester should be admissible as evidence?
[1] strongly agree

[2] agree
[3] neutral
[4] disagree
[5] strongly disagree
70) Why do you feel this way?
71) Do you feel that the result of a Lie Detector Test, performed on the alleged
survivor/victim should be admissible as evidence?
[1] strongly agree
[2] agree
[3] neutral
[4] disagree
[5] strongly disagree
72)Why do you feel this way?
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In the section titled "Imponuning" 2907.07, (B) of the Revised Code it states,
"No person shall solicit a person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity
with the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation is offensive
to the other person, or is reckless in that regard"
Under this law this activity is classified as a first degree misdemeanor.
73) Do you feel that such an activity should be punished under the law?

I
f--

----

[1] strongly agree
[2] agree

[3] neutral
[4] disagree
[5]

strongly disagree

74) Why do you feel this way?

[
75) If you strongly agree or agree, what do you think of the classification of
this activity as a first degree misdemeanor?

I

I
I

[1] too severe
[2] appropriate
[3] not severe enough
[4] neutral

76) If you feel that this sentence is not severe enough, how would you classify
this activity?
77) If the law read
"No person shall solicit a person of the opposite sex to engage in sexual
activity with the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation is
offensive to the other person, or is reckless in that regard"

I

Would you feel that such an activity should be punished under the law?

1__ _

strongly agree
agree
[3] neutral
[4] disagree
[5] strongly disagree
[1]
[2]

78) If you answered disagree or strongly disagree to #73, would this addition to
the legal code change your opinion?

9

